p1neappleXpress/OpenFlux

Network stack research tool. TCP tunnel with pluggable transports.

OpenFlux

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Network stack research tool. TCP tunnel with pluggable transports.

Disclaimer

The author of OpenFlux does not encourage the use of this project to bypass restrictions or violate the rules of any platform, and is not responsible for the final scenarios of how users apply this tool in real life or on the Internet. Any specific technical features of the application are nothing more than an architectural coincidence, created without any intent.

The project is entirely non-commercial, contains no paid features, hidden subscriptions, or commercial benefit.

The author is not responsible for forks, modifications, or derivative versions of OpenFlux created by third parties. Any changes added to a fork are the responsibility of its author.

The author is not responsible for:

• Any use of OpenFlux by third parties
• Consequences caused by the use of forks and modifications
• Damage resulting from derivative versions
• Violations committed using forks

The original code is provided as is, without any warranties.

Clients

iOS app built by @saharev1 — full iOS client, TestFlight pipeline, system VPN support, DNS-over-TLS, and many stability fixes. HUGE thanks! 🙏 Android app — p1neappleXpress/OpenFluxAndroid.

Overview

Client (SOCKS5) --> Transport --> Exit Node --> Internet

Requirements

1. Golang v. 1.26.3+ - is required for building desktop client / exit node binary (universal-bypass-tool);
2. Android Native Development Kit (NDK) v.27.0.12077973+ - is required for building Android client binary;
3. XCode v. 26.6+ - is required for building iOS client binary;
4. Linux VPS / VDS exit node.

Overview

TCP packets are sent via Transport. Currently, there are two transports available:

1. Yandex - sends packets via Yandex Docs cursor messages;
2. Max - sends packets via WebRTC DataChannel WARNING:
   • Do not use your primary or important MAX account.
   • Do not use an account whose deletion or loss of access would be critical.
   • Usage via an external VPS may lead to account restrictions.
   • The restriction may persist after stopping OpenFlux.
   • MAX transport should be considered experimental until the blocking mechanism is understood.

Client side runs a SOCKS5 proxy, exit node decapsulates and forwards packets to destination point.

Structure

OpenFlux/
├── main.go                     # CLI entry (client / exit-node)
├── export_ios.go               # cgo bridge for the iOS static library (build tag: ios)
├── transport/
│   ├── transport.go            # Transport interface
│   ├── compressor.go           # Compression wrapper
│   ├── yandex/                 # Yandex Docs backend
│   └── oneme/                  # MAX Messenger backend
├── tunnel/
│   ├── tunnel.go               # TCP tunnel core
│   ├── endpoint.go             # Virtual NIC
│   └── rawsocket_{linux,darwin,windows}.go  # Raw socket (exit node), per-OS
├── socks5/                     # SOCKS5 server
├── network/                    # Checksums, packet parsing
├── utils/                      # Logging
├── ios-app/                    # SwiftUI iOS client (XcodeGen), links liboflux.a
├── build_ios.sh                # Build the iOS static library (liboflux.a)
├── build_ios_app.sh            # Build + archive + export the iOS app IPA
└── build_android.sh            # Build the Android client binary

Build (desktop client / exit-node binary)

go mod tidy
go build -o universal-bypass-tool .

Build for Android (client binary)

export ANDROID_NDK_HOME=
./build_android.sh

Build for iOS (client binary)

export XCODE_PATH="" # optional, defaults to /Applications/Xcode.app
./build_ios.sh

Usage

1. Setting up exit node

1. You must have root access on exit node machine;
2. Only legacy Yandex document editor is supported (you can toggle this setting from the interface).

The exit node's TCP connections live in a userspace stack (gvisor), so the kernel has no socket for them and would send an RST on every reply, tearing the tunnel down. That RST must be suppressed — but do it scoped, not host-wide. A blanket -j DROP on all outbound RSTs makes every closed port answer with silence (scanners see filtered instead of closed) and stops the host from resetting unrelated connections.

Recommended (scoped to a dedicated egress IP):

# give the box a second/alias IP for the tunnel, e.g. 203.0.113.10
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags RST RST -s 203.0.113.10 -j DROP
sudo ./universal-bypass-tool --exit-node --local-ip 203.0.113.10 \
    --url "YOUR_YANDEX_DOC_URL" --debug

Even cleaner: run the exit node in its own network namespace / container so the rule never touches the host's main services. Note that -m owner --uid-owner does not work here — the tunnel-breaking RSTs are generated by the kernel with no owning socket, so the owner match never fires.

Host-wide fallback (only on a single-purpose box, understanding the trade-off):

sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP
sudo ./universal-bypass-tool --exit-node --url "YOUR_YANDEX_DOC_URL" --debug

1. Setting up desktop client:

Setup commands for desktop client:

./universal-bypass-tool --client --url "YOUR_YANDEX_DOC_URL" --socks5 :1080 --debug

Then set up SOCKS5 proxy in your browser at localhost:1080.

Flags

Implementing custom transports

You are free to implement the Transport interface from transport/transport.go and register your custom transport in main.go switch block.

License

This project is licensed under the GNU General Public License v3.0 or later. See LICENSE for the full text.

Third-party licenses are listed in NOTICE.

Disclaimer

Educational use only. Test on your own machines and networks.

Support the project

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