Some New Data on Age Authentication Balk Rates

Created by ChatGPT May 2026

The issue is: if a website imposes a government-compelled age authentication wall, what percentage of users will stop at the authentication wall, either because the users turn around or fail to navigate the process? I call that percentage the “balk” rate. For background on prior studies and why balk rates can vary widely, read my prior coverage first.

I’m now reporting on a study by All About Cookies entitled “72% of Americans Don’t Trust the Companies Verifying Their Age Online.” The writeup qualifies the headline claim: “72% of Americans express low levels of trust in the companies and services handling age verification data, including 40% who do not trust them at all.” The other 32% say they “slightly” trust the authenticators.

This chart shows what happened when users were confronted with an age authentication wall (users could select multiple options):

I disregard the first and third options because they are self-reporting, and that isn’t an “authentication” at all. Instead, focus on the bottom three options, all of which are rejections of the age authentication wall (go somewhere else, abandon the effort, or bypass the wall using VPNs). The first two are balk rates; the third also rejects the age authentication wall.

One way of reading this data is that only 31% of consumers were willing to age-authenticate; all other consumers chose some other non-authentication option if they could. Because users could pick multiple choices, we can’t combine the three rejection options (which adds up to 32%) and compare it to the 31% who said they authenticate. But even if we take the most conservative reading of this data and say that there’s at least an 11% balk rate, that’s still a lot of disruption of existing user activity.

The report summarizes this chart with this confusing statement: “Age verification laws don’t get more people to verify: 31% complete verification in states with and without laws. Instead, people in law states are 7x more likely to give up entirely and 4x more likely to use a VPN.” The survey didn’t provide the supporting data to explain the 7x assessment, but I interpret it as a warning that the quantity of consumer balks will soar as more states’ age authentication mandates come into effect.

The next chart asks how comfortable users would be sharing the specific items of data to get through an age authentication wall:

As you can see, the “least” troubling option is an automatically scanned selfie, which more than 2/3 said they would be uncomfortable with sharing. Credit card authentication–which used to be the benchmark for age authentication in the 1990s and is now considered no longer credible–made nearly 9 of 10 consumers uncomfortable.

Over time, these discomfort rates might organically decline as age authentication mandates become ubiquitous, which will cause consumers become to desensitized to the omnipresent privacy invasions.

Zero-knowledge proofs might also change how consumers feel about sharing their government-issued IDs because the ID contents would not be shared. However, to reach that point, consumers first will have to overcome the many troubling implications of installing a government-issued digital ID on their device. Personally, I’m a hard “no” on digital IDs.

We can’t directly infer a balk rate from this data, but it’s not good. When users are uncomfortable with the data disclosure, they weigh the costs/benefits of proceeding. If they can’t easily assess the benefits–which will often be the case with new services that the consumer doesn’t know well–then the discomfort is likely to increase balk rates. As I mention in my Segregate-and-Suppress paper, the resulting changes in consumer behavior are likely to hinder new market entrants and overall market dynamism.

Overall, I don’t see how anyone, especially government regulators, can look at the emerging balk rate data and think that the Internet is going to be just fine when online age authentication mandates become ubiquitous.

Blog Posts on Segregate-and-Suppress Obligations

• More Data on Online Age Authentication Balk Rates
• Fifth Circuit Keeps Doing Fifth Circuit Things –SEAT v. Paxton
• How Often Do Consumers Balk at Doing Online Age Authentication?
• Court Enjoins Another Arkansas Segregate-and-Suppress Law–NetChoice v. Griffin
• Too Many Courts Are Letting States Take Wrecking Balls to the Internet (Roundup)
• Texas Judge Enjoins App Store Authentication Law–CCIA and SEAT v. Paxton
• Courts Enjoin Internet Censorship Laws in Louisana and Arkansas
• Challenge to Maryland’s “Kid Code” Survives Motion to Dismiss–NetChoice v. Brown
• My Testimony Against Mandatory Online Age Authentication
• Read the Published Version of My Paper Against Mandatory Online Age Authentication
• Prof. Goldman’s Statement on the Supreme Court’s Demolition of the Internet in Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton
• Court Permanently Enjoins Ohio’s Segregate-and-Suppress/Parental Consent Law–NetChoice v. Yost
• Arkansas’ Social Media Safety Act Permanently Enjoined—NetChoice v. Griffin
• Why I Emphatically Oppose Online Age Verification Mandates
• California’s Age-Appropriate Design Code (AADC) Is Completely Unconstitutional (Multiple Ways)–NetChoice v. Bonta
• Another Conflict Between Privacy Laws and Age Authentication–Murphy v. Confirm ID
• Recapping Three Social Media Addiction Opinions from Fall (Catch-Up Post)
• District Court Blocks More of Texas’ Segregate-and-Suppress Law (HB 18)–SEAT v. Paxton
• Comments on the Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton SCOTUS Oral Arguments on Mandatory Online Age “Verification”
• California’s “Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act” Is Partially Unconstitutional…But Other Parts Are Green-Lighted–NetChoice v. Bonta
• Section 230 Defeats Underage User’s Lawsuit Against Grindr–Doll v. Pelphrey
• Five Decisions Illustrate How Section 230 Is Fading Fast
• Internet Law Professors Submit a SCOTUS Amicus Brief on Online Age Authentication–Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton
• Court Enjoins the Utah “Minor Protection in Social Media Act”–NetChoice v. Reyes
• Another Texas Online Censorship Law Partially Enjoined–CCIA v. Paxton
• When It Comes to Section 230, the Ninth Circuit is a Chaos Agent–Estate of Bride v. YOLO
• Court Dismisses School Districts’ Lawsuits Over Social Media “Addiction”–In re Social Media Cases
• Ninth Circuit Strikes Down Key Part of the CA Age-Appropriate Design Code (the Rest is TBD)–NetChoice v. Bonta
• Mississippi’s Age-Authentication Law Declared Unconstitutional–NetChoice v. Fitch
• Indiana’s Anti-Online Porn Law “Is Not Close” to Constitutional–Free Speech Coalition v. Rokita
• Fifth Circuit Once Again Disregards Supreme Court Precedent and Mangles Section 230–Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton
• Snapchat Isn’t Liable for Offline Sexual Abuse–VV v. Meta
• 2023 Quick Links: Censorship
• Court Enjoins Ohio’s Law Requiring Parental Approval for Children’s Social Media Accounts–NetChoice v. Yost
• Many Fifth Circuit Judges Hope to Eviscerate Section 230–Doe v. Snap
• Louisiana’s Age Authentication Mandate Avoids Constitutional Scrutiny Using a Legislative Drafting Trick–Free Speech Coalition v. LeBlanc
• Section 230 Once Again Applies to Claims Over Offline Sexual Abuse–Doe v. Grindr
• Comments on the Ruling Declaring California’s Age-Appropriate Design Code (AADC) Unconstitutional–NetChoice v. Bonta
• Two Separate Courts Reiterate That Online Age Authentication Mandates Are Unconstitutional
• Minnesota’s Attempt to Copy California’s Constitutionally Defective Age Appropriate Design Code is an Utter Fail (Guest Blog Post)
• Do Mandatory Age Verification Laws Conflict with Biometric Privacy Laws?–Kuklinski v. Binance
• Why I Think California’s Age-Appropriate Design Code (AADC) Is Unconstitutional
• An Interview Regarding AB 2273/the California Age-Appropriate Design Code (AADC)
• Op-Ed: The Plan to Blow Up the Internet, Ostensibly to Protect Kids Online (Regarding AB 2273)
• A Short Explainer of Why California’s Social Media Addiction Bill (AB 2408) Is Terrible
• A Short Explainer of How California’s Age-Appropriate Design Code Bill (AB2273) Would Break the Internet
• Is the California Legislature Addicted to Performative Election-Year Stunts That Threaten the Internet? (Comments on AB2408)
• Omegle Denied Section 230 Dismissal–AM v. Omegle
• Snapchat Isn’t Liable for a Teacher’s Sexual Predation–Doe v. Snap
• Will California Eliminate Anonymous Web Browsing? (Comments on CA AB 2273, The Age-Appropriate Design Code Act)
• Minnesota Wants to Ban Under-18s From User-Generated Content Services
• California’s Latest Effort To Keep Some Ads From Reaching Kids Is Misguided And Unconstitutional (Forbes Cross-Post)
• Backpage Gets Important 47 USC 230 Win Against Washington Law Trying to Combat Online Prostitution Ads (Forbes Cross-Post & More)
• Backpage Gets TRO Against Washington Law Attempting to Bypass Section 230–Backpage v. McKenna
• MySpace Wins Another 47 USC 230 Case Over Sexual Assaults of Users–Doe II v. MySpace
• MySpace Gets 230 Win in Fifth Circuit–Doe v. MySpace
• Website Isn’t Liable When Users Lie About Their Ages–Doe v. SexSearch

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