The excess pessimism of early nuclear bomb designers

From GPT Pro:

The Manhattan Project scientists were remarkably good technological and arms-race forecasters. They correctly rejected the idea that America’s nuclear monopoly could be maintained; the Soviet bomb arrived in 1949. They anticipated thermonuclear weapons, huge arsenals and the extreme vulnerability of cities. Where many of them went wrong was in moving from “a nuclear war would be catastrophic” to “therefore a catastrophic nuclear war is fairly likely.” They tended to underweight the endogenous response of political and military institutions to the catastrophe—the emergence of second-strike forces, elaborate command systems, crisis management, and above all mutually assured retaliation. There is even some contemporary evidence for an insider/ordinary-public gap. In August 1945, 69% of Americans told Gallup that development of the atomic bomb was a “good thing,” versus only 17% saying it was bad. The scientists campaigning for international control plainly regarded the public as far too complacent. So I would summarize the historical evidence this way: The bomb’s developers were, on average, unusually pessimistic about the political consequences of their invention, and noticeably more pessimistic than the general public.

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