SAD Scheme Plaintiff Must Pay $40k to Defendant–Guangzhou Tinpod v. Schedule A Defendants

The plaintiff is Guangzhou Tinpod Electronic Technology Co. The plaintiff initially sued under the XYZ pseudonym and hasn’t updated the case caption, even though its identity is no longer sealed.

I presume the plaintiff and many of the 44 defendants are Chinese entities. This case appears to be another example of how the SAD Scheme has become one of the U.S.’s most popular exports to China.

The plaintiff claims that the defendants infringed its copyright, including registration #VAu 1-517-249, titled “Black Castor Oil 1 and 3 Other Unpublished Works.”

As usual with SAD Scheme cases, the plaintiff initially obtained an ex parte TRO. Then, Shenzhen Moulis Electronic Co., Ltd., on behalf of 18 defendants (the “Aliver Defendants”), appeared in the case and started poking holes in the plaintiff’s assertions.

Following the preliminary injunction hearing, the plaintiff dismissed the defendants voluntarily with prejudice. Voluntary dismissals are a standard tactic when SAD Scheme cases become contested. From the plaintiff’s standpoint, it’s better to cut loose the squeaky defendants who might disrupt the entire case, so the plaintiff can keep squeezing the other defendants.

However, it is less typical for the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the defendants with prejudice. Normally that occurs only after a settlement, which did not happen here. The court calls the plaintiff’s dismissal with prejudice “unusual.”

The Aliver Defendants then sought a 505 attorneys’ fee shift of nearly $40k, which the court grants.

Did the Aliver Defendants Prevail?

When copyright plaintiffs are losing, a voluntary dismissal provides a way to reduce any residual exposure, because judges rarely order a fee shift for a defendant who is already out of the case. Also, at least in the 11th Circuit, a court doesn’t have the statutory authority to issue a fee shift to a defendant dismissed without prejudice.

But here, the plaintiff dismissed with prejudice, and the court treats the requested fee shift here as a novel question: “does a defendant prevail if the dismissal materially changes the relationship between the parties but the dismissal does not require judicial imprimatur other than a perfunctory order closing the matter?”

The court says yes: “Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief against the Aliver Defendants but obtained neither.” The court notes how badly the case was going for the plaintiff:

At the preliminary injunction hearing, the Aliver Defendants argued—and the Court agreed—that Plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its copyright claim against the Aliver Defendants. The Court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief was based on multiple glaring issues with Plaintiff’s claim, including that Plaintiff failed to allege or provide evidence to support that the Aliver Defendants had access to or copied Plaintiff’s alleged copyrighted artwork and failed to rebut the other issues raised by the Aliver Defendants regarding Plaintiff’s creation, ownership, and publishing of the alleged copyrighted artwork. It was only after the Court denied Plaintiff’s PI Motion, on the basis that Plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its claim, that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against the Aliver Defendants with prejudice. The fact that Plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal was with prejudice—as opposed to without prejudice—is persuasive here even if the dismissal did not require judicial imprimatur. A voluntary dismissal without prejudice generally leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought and does not prevent the plaintiff from refiling. By contrast, Plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice permanently barred Plaintiff from reasserting the same copyright claims against the Aliver Defendants…. here, the Court denied Plaintiff’s PI Motion on the ground that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and identified on the record the specific deficiencies in Plaintiff’s allegations against the Aliver Defendants. In doing so, the Court effectively “rebuffed” Plaintiff’s claims. Ultimately, the rights of the parties were conclusively resolved following the preliminary injunction ruling: Plaintiff’s subsequent voluntary dismissal with prejudice permanently barred re-litigation of the very claims the Court had already found deficient. The Court’s rejection of the viability of Plaintiff’s claims coupled with Plaintiff’s with-prejudice dismissal renders the Aliver Defendants prevailing parties

So, the big mystery of this case: why did the plaintiff choose to dismiss with prejudice? Occam’s razor suggests that it was an unforced error.

(To be clear, we should favor plaintiffs dismissing with prejudice rather than without. Dismissals without prejudice leave a Sword of Damocles hanging over the defendants’ heads, with associated inhibiting effects).

Factors Supporting 505 Fee Shift

Having determined the defendants’ eligibility for a fee shift, the court decides it’s appropriate to issue a fee shift here because:

  • “Aliver Defendants achieved complete success.”
  • “Plaintiff’s copyright theory was objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff alleged infringement of unpublished works but did not adequately allege access, even after the Aliver Defendants identified that deficiency”
  • “compensation and deterrence favor fees” because it encourages plaintiffs to scrutinize their claims (which they should be doing anyway)

This is a good reminder of why copyright owners have not embraced the SAD Scheme as thoroughly as trademark owners. While the copyright and trademark statutes both have attorneys’ fee shifting provisions, courts are more willing to grant fee shifts in copyright cases. As we’ve seen for decades, it’s hard to run a copyright-based online trolling campaign when fee shifts cause the profit meter to run in reverse.

Implications

In contrast to the resolution of many SAD Scheme cases, this case resolved comparatively favorably for the defense. The defendant got the claims dismissed and an award of their attorneys’ fees.

Great, but this outcome still isn’t good news. The court wrongly issued a TRO based on an apparently defective copyright claim. Worse, as the court itself described, the case had “multiple glaring issues”–but, I guess, not glaring enough for the court to catch them at the TRO stage? In other words, had the judge more aggressively policed the plaintiff’s ex parte requests, this case never should have proceeded against the Aliver Defendants. Further, the judge doesn’t acknowledge her complicity, order any further sanctions against the plaintiff, or even scold the plaintiff for extracting an undeserved TRO from her.

The court’s choices not to hold the plaintiff fully accountable or lament her role in the scheme is one of the reasons the SAD Scheme keeps perpetuating. In plaintiffs’ efforts to create SAD Scheme omelettes, they routinely and predictably break some eggs, and the courts don’t adequately impose consequences for the messes they make. #StopTheSADScheme.

Case Citation: XYZ Corp. v. Schedule A Defendants, 0:24-cv-61886-JB (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2026)

SUPPLEMENT: Ningbo Jiaruisi E-Commerce Co., Ltd. v. WHAM-O Holding, Ltd., No. 1:26-cv-10701 (N.D. Ill. complaint filed Sept. 3, 2026). This lawsuit represents some of the fallout from the Seventh Circuit’s Kangol v. Hangzhou Silk decision, which rejected email service on many Chinese defendants. The complaint summarizes its purpose:

to obtain relief from default judgments and related orders entered in Northern District of Illinois “Schedule A” cases against mainland-China defendants who were incorrectly served via email pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3) and not through the Hague Service Convention, did not appear, did not settle, and were subjected to default judgments, asset restraints and collection. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and equitable relief, including relief from void judgments, an accounting, restitution of funds collected under such judgments, taxable costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses to the extent authorized by law, including from any common fund or monetary benefit created, preserved, or restored through this action, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and related relief necessary to restore the parties to the position they would have occupied absent the improper entry and enforcement of those judgments.

This case reinforces how judges don’t voluntarily clean up, or even acknowledge, any mistakes they made in past SAD Scheme rulings. Following Kangol, it’s now clear that a huge number of SAD Scheme defendants were not properly served, but what steps are the courts voluntarily taking to correct those due process violations? As far as I can tell, none. I’m not sure if this lawsuit is the right redress mechanism, but I hope the harmed defendants find some relief.

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

The post appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

添加评论
点赞收藏
点踩分享查看原文
评论
?
参与讨论