Don’t write off Russia’s defence industry yet

The writer is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Despite Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes, it is far too early to write off Russia, which is rebuilding its military in ways that many in the west have underestimated. Instead of simply replacing battlefield losses, it is creating a defence industry that combines Soviet-era industrial capacity with the demands of 21st-century warfare. The goal is not just to produce more tanks, but to reshape its military around the “asymmetric” advantages revealed by the war in Ukraine: drones, compact electronic warfare systems and other low-cost technologies that can be fielded at scale.

The long-term challenge may be even greater for Europe than for Ukraine, whose military has spent more than a decade adapting to old Russian tactics and capabilities.

Russia’s hybrid state-market model now combines the Soviet system’s capacity for industrial mobilisation with the flexibility of market competition. Russia inherited a vast infrastructure that enables it to scale production of selected weapons and systems much faster than most western defence industries. Since 2022, Russia has continued expanding its defence base: satellite imagery shows major new construction at production sites for state-backed conglomerates like Kalashnikov and Almaz-Antey.

Today’s system selectively incorporates market incentives, private companies and decentralised innovation. A good example is the Ushkuynik, a technology accelerator that bridges domestic start-up and technical volunteer efforts with larger defence-industrial enterprises and the state acquisition system. This set-up enables small-scale efforts that would normally remain outside the ministry’s orbit to respond to frontline needs. This model also makes sanctions evasion easier. Instead of solely relying on state procurement, private firms and intermediary networks employ shell companies, third-country distributors and ecommerce platforms such as Alibaba to buy dual-use western components while circumventing export controls.

Contrary to expectations, Soviet-era defence giants have proved adaptable, prioritising scalable, low-cost capabilities — such as drones and compact electronic warfare. Legacy manufacturers are increasingly investing in unmanned systems, AI-enabled targeting and autonomous technologies. Kalashnikov’s partnerships with grassroots initiatives such as Ushkuynik and Project Archangel illustrate how wartime innovation is consolidated under major state defence contractors. Russia’s Geran long-range drones have evolved from the original Iranian propeller-driven design to jet-powered versions, as well as newer variants operating on mesh networks (a self-organising wireless network allowing drones to communicate directly and relay data through one another). Electronic warfare has undergone a similar transformation: rather than relying on large, strategic systems, Russia has started fielding thousands of compact counter-drone systems to jam communications and disrupt navigation.

As a result, drone production has expanded dramatically. Russia plans to produce 7.3mn first-person view drones in 2026 and reportedly delivered more than 130,000 low-cost electronic warfare systems in 2025. Monthly production of Gerans alone is vastly exceeding America’s current deployment of the Lucas loitering munition, itself a reverse-engineered version of the Iranian Shahed.

Finally, the war has created a feedback loop between the front lines and factories, allowing Russian companies to test, refine and field new systems rapidly. These battlefield-tested systems are generating international interest. Russian companies have marketed combat-proven equipment at international arms exhibitions, leading to export deals. In 2026, Kalashnikov signed an agreement to supply civilian UAVs to an Indian partner. This demand is likely to grow, particularly across the global south.

Combined with a force of roughly 700,000 currently deployed in Ukraine, these capabilities could offer important advantages in a future conflict with Nato, especially if Russia’s defence-industrial base remains on a wartime footing, allowing it to replenish equipment and expand capacity faster than most western countries.

Moscow could then seek to offset western technological advantages through attrition, extensive drone warfare and disruption of communications through electronic warfare. While Russia has spent years adapting to counter western weapons and tactics on the battlefield, Nato has had far fewer opportunities to develop comparable experience. It is time to start closing that gap.

Samuel Bendett contributed to this article