The US Is Losing Brazil to China

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Apart from being Brazil’s most popular football clubs, Flamengo, Corinthians and Palmeiras have one other thing in common: All three signed sponsorship deals with Chinese carmakers this year.

Football may be king, but it’s not the only arena where Chinese companies are taking Brazil by storm. From BYD Co. electric cars and Xiaomi Corp. smartphones to Didi’s 99 ride-hailing app, Chinese brands have become fixtures on Brazilian streets and phone screens, the result of an aggressive push into Latin America’s largest consumer market. It’s giving Beijing growing influence, soft power and economic leverage at a time when Washington is explicitly trying to roll back China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere.

Geopolitics may not top the list of concerns for the almost 159 million Brazilians eligible to vote on Sunday, but the US-China rivalry will quietly loom over the year’s most consequential election. A victory by challenger Flávio Bolsonaro would bring Brazil closer to the US, given his family’s warm ties to Donald Trump’s White House. A reelection of incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, by contrast, would likely revive many of the tensions that have marked the past two years of Trump’s return to power, including the activism of the China-led BRICS bloc.

Yet that binary view misses the bigger story: In many ways, the US has already lost much of its strategic influence in Brazil to China, which is forging a deeper commercial, business and political alliance with the region’s biggest economy. That’s unlikely to be reversed anytime soon, regardless of the Oct. 4 vote.

Yes, Flávio would probably align more closely with Trump on fighting organized crime and protecting strategic sectors. He would likely build a strong partnership with the White House on headline-grabbing initiatives such as the Shield of the Americas. He may even succeed in reducing the US’s inexcusable tariffs on Brazilian exports and accelerate cooperation on critical minerals. But if you think a Bolsonaro presidency would be willing to jeopardize Brazil’s relationship with China, think again.

Take trade. China became Brazil’s largest trading partner in 2009, and the relationship has only boomed since. The Asian giant accounted for just over 29% of Brazil’s total trade in the first eight months of this year, compared with only 11.5% for the US, according to government data. A decade ago, the gap was far narrower: 19% versus just under 15%.

This year, Brazil’s exports to China are set to smash another record, led by soybeans and oil shipments, making the Asian country responsible for almost half of the South American nation’s total trade surplus. And Brazil is also buying more and more from China, importing $52.3 billion worth of goods through August, almost twice as much as the $27.3 billion it bought from the US amid Trump’s protectionist turn.

Brazil was the world’s top destination for Chinese investments in 2025, according to estimates by the Brazil-China Business Council, a Rio de Janeiro-based nonprofit focused on bilateral relations. China has accumulated an investment stock of $85.5 billion across 355 projects since 2007, the group found. Among the recent highest-profile examples, ByteDance Ltd.’s TikTok announced in December more than 200 billion reais ($38.6 billion) in data center investments in the northeastern state of Ceará, its first project in Latin America.

As a result, Brazil’s economic integration with its fellow BRICS member is now so extensive that it would be politically suicidal for any leader to put it at risk. Jair Bolsonaro, Flávio’s imprisoned father, governed pragmatically between 2019 and 2022 despite his sympathies for Trump, fully aware of how dependent Brazil's powerful farm lobby is on Chinese demand. If elected, his heir may be more vocal about aligning with Washington, but he’s unlikely to stray far from Brazil’s longstanding tradition of balancing between great powers. If there is one thing Brazilian policymakers dread these days, it’s being forced to choose between the US and China. And unlike the US, China isn’t asking them to.

That’s the scale of the strategic challenge facing the US in Brazil. Despite the country’s historic pro-Americanism, China’s economic presence is moving up the value chain, while Trump’s repeated attacks have damaged the US’s image among ordinary Brazilians. A recent PoderData poll found that 52% of voters say Brazil should strengthen trade ties with China, while only 35% say it should prioritize the US. That’s almost the inverse of the same poll a year earlier. The US soft-power deficit won’t disappear with a new government in Brasilia or a bit of diplomatic slap and tickle. After all, Trump has spent his second term thus far without a confirmed ambassador in Brasilia.

Notwithstanding the recent fireworks in bilateral relations, Washington has a real and timely opening to rebuild America’s presence and influence in Brazil. On a recent trip to Brasilia, I heard strategists warn about the risks of growing too close to China — and not only because of the backlash it could provoke from the White House. Concern is rising about the underlying dynamic of Brazil’s economic ties with China: It still exports mostly commodities while importing from China manufactured products and intermediate goods, leaving the country in a weaker position to create value-added industrial jobs.

The boom in relatively inexpensive Chinese hybrid and electric vehicles, for instance, is great news for Brazilian consumers. But it’s a serious challenge for Brazil’s auto industry and its suppliers, which argue, not without reason, that they’re competing on an uneven playing field. This is precisely the kind of sector where the US and Europe could partner with Brazil to build alternative supply chains that strengthen local industry and reduce the country’s growing dependence on China.

Yet that will require time, money and sustained engagement, not exactly the defining traits of today’s politics. Washington may view a Bolsonaro victory as its own, a vindication of its Brazil policy and proof that Latin America’s rightward shift is complete. Translating that into business, investment and lasting strategic influence, however, will be much harder. Just ask Argentina’s Javier Milei or Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa, two of the White House’s closest regional allies who continue to exploit economic ties with China. If the US wants to win back Brazil’s heart and soul, an ideological affinity at the top won’t be enough.