Space: the final frontline
A new space race is under way. But this time the race is not about exploring or commercialising the final frontier but weaponising it.
This month, the US became the first country to admit to deploying weapons in space. “On-orbit space control weapons” had already been deployed to defend against hostile adversaries, Troy Meink, Air Force secretary, announced.
The US did not identify the weapons. But military experts have speculated they might include lasers or high-powered microwave systems designed to jam satellites’ electronics. They could even include attack satellites that use grappling robotic arms to disable an enemy’s spacecraft or knock it off orbit.
China quickly denounced the US move, saying it opposed any “space arms race”. Russia also said space must remain free of any weapons. But, just like the US, both countries have for decades been surreptitiously testing counterspace measures to degrade or destroy their rivals’ space assets. Washington’s relative openness should be welcomed.
As far back as 2007, China demonstrated its offensive capabilities in space by blowing up one of its own ageing weather satellites using a ground-based missile. An FT report earlier this year also described Beijing’s expanding counterspace programme. Meanwhile, western officials have accused Russia of using space-based systems to trigger GPS navigation outages across Europe on scores of occasions since 2019.
This militarisation of space is another depressing example of the fraying of our fragile web of international governance. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, negotiated at the height of the cold war, was a remarkable achievement. Now backed by 118 countries, the treaty enshrines the principles that space should remain a common domain for all humanity and bans the deployment of any orbiting weapons of mass destruction.
But in another respect, the admission of US capabilities may simply reflect current geopolitical realities as so many countries and companies jostle for strategic and commercial advantage in space. The US-Soviet state duopoly of space ended long ago. More than 80 countries now operate satellites with a total of 18,000 currently orbiting Earth. Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite service accounts for more than half.
The latest US announcement will not come as a surprise to readers of the 371-page Global Counterspace Capabilities Report published earlier this year by the non-profit Secure World Foundation. The report records how successive US administrations have regarded space as a warfighting domain since the 1960s. But up until now space skirmishing has been confined to non-kinetic attempts to jam, spoof or hack rivals’ satellites.
Although they may not contravene the Outer Space Treaty, the danger of such attacks is that they are often invisible and usually deniable. The ways in which satellites often combine both civilian and military uses also blur the lines. In Russia’s eyes, Starlink is a lawful military target given its widespread use by Ukraine, for example. That opacity could lead to fatal miscalculation in the event of any escalation of conflict. “The more you invest in space the more incentive you have for it to be a stable and principled domain,” argues Victoria Samson, co-editor of the SWF report.
Still more worrying, however, would be if any country started blowing up rivals’ satellites. US strategists are particularly concerned by reports that Russia has been considering the use of nuclear weapons in space. This space-based threat has been one factor in Washington pressing ahead with its staggeringly expensive missile shield, known as the Golden Dome. Any use of physically destructive space weapons could result in massive collateral damage, harming foe and friend alike. The nightmare scenario is that cascading space debris could make it impossible to operate any satellites in low Earth orbit for generations, a phenomenon known as the Kessler Syndrome.
Bluffing has always been central to military strategy. But today greater transparency might help prevent ricocheting mistakes. The history of the cold war is instructive, suggests Clayton Swope of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Despite their latent hostility, the US and Soviet Union still concluded nuclear arms control agreements for mutual advantage. “I don’t think we should rule that out in space today,” Swope says.
After all, deterrence works best when all sides know the others’ capabilities and understand the likely consequences of their actions. US President Donald Trump should find time for some frank talk on the subject when Chinese leader Xi Jinping is in Washington this week.