Spinoza on the Human Perspective

In the 1960s, Alexandre Matheron and Louis Althusser portrayed Spinoza as an anti-humanist thinker who rejected the idea of a specific human nature. A strong monistic interpretation also implies marginalizing human essence as distinct from the essence of other finite things since modes are united with the substance. This collection of essays shifts the focus to show that Spinoza’s philosophy was indeed about human nature. Spinoza on the Human Perspective contains papers by leading international scholars who analyze Spinoza’s concern with human life.

Part I addresses the following questions: Is there a unified, specific concept of human essence? Did Spinoza develop a new “metaphysics of form”, as Pierre-François Moreau argues? Do we need additional concepts, such as “lifeform” to better understand the peculiarities of Spinoza’s conception of humanity? In “The Identity of Indiscernibles and Human Essence in Spinoza’s Ethics”, Michael LeBuffe analyzes three puzzles about humanity in the Ethics: Is human essence real or imaginary? Is Spinoza’s ethics based on egoism or humanism? And why is rational conflict among human beings impossible? LeBuffe notably claims that there is a unified human essence, even though humans can differ as individuals due to external causes. He also argues that Spinoza’s ethics is both humanistic and egoistic, and that rational conflict would be a conflict of a thing with itself.

In “Spinoza on the Notion of a Human Form”, Sarah Tropper focuses on the concept of “form” as applied to human nature. Her approach differs from that of François Zourabichvili in A Physics of Thought. She claims that the Spinozian concept of form is similar to that of Aristotle, except it is a non-substantial form, while Zourabichvili supported a materialistic interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of “form”, rooted in the “little physics”. She also explains how the concept of the human form permits changes within certain limits in the context of a gradualistic ethics. In “Non-Essentialist, Activity-Grounded Lifeforms”, Barnaby R. Hutchins imports the concept of “lifeform”, which is generally used in biological contexts, to understand Spinoza’s conception of humanity. While this concept is usually associated with essentialism, Hutchins attempts to show that a realist, nonessentialist concept of “lifeform” applies to Spinoza’s concept of human nature. It implies that “it is not that species grounds agreement; rather, agreement is what grounds species” (50). However, this reasoning is based on effects rather than causes. Agreement in nature could be seen as conditioned by a set of aptitudes belonging to a species.

Part II of the volume focuses on the model of human nature. Does Spinoza’s philosophy offer a real or a nominalist conception of human nature? In “Human Nature in Spinoza’s Philosophy”, Julie R. Klein follows Alexandre Matheron’s argument that Spinoza never defines what characterizes human nature, despite speaking of it. She advocates for a nominalist interpretation of human nature, positing that agreement in nature is based on likeness rather than a shared substantial form or essence, as in the Platonizing interpretation.

Another question raised in Part II of the volume is: How does this definition of human nature relate to our interactions with others? In “Homo homini Deus, & Homo homini Lupus: Spinoza on Human Nature and Human Relations”, Steven Nadler offers first a reading of why, for Spinoza, “Man is a God to Man” for selfish, rather than altruistic motives, which is consistent with views he has developed elsewhere. He also argues that “Man is a wolf to man”, not only due to passions, but also due to human nature itself, as we may be driven to desire the same goods in the same social space. However, one might object to this Hobbesian interpretation of Spinoza on the grounds that we only contradict ourselves to the extent that we are powerless against our passions (E4p33-34), rather than due to human nature as defined in positive terms (E4p32d). It is impossible to agree with other human beings in nature when acting under the influence of passions since passions are negation and it is impossible to agree with something else if negation is involved (E4p32s).

Part III focuses on knowledge and the human lifeform. It addresses the following questions: What is unique about human beings? How do they distinguish themselves from other beings in Nature? In “Living as a Human Being and Self-Interpretation”, Lia Levy rejects the idea of human nature being described as an essence or species. She considers the model of human nature as a regulative being of reason that serves a practical purpose. According to Levy, we are constantly self-interpreting our existence in terms of the model of human nature that we are trying to emulate.

In “The Idea of the Idea, Consciousness, and Human Experience in Spinoza’s Ethics”, Oliver Istvan Toth argues that, if Spinoza’s philosophy is primarily a philosophy for humans, it is “a philosophy of consciousness rather than a philosophy of being” (121). In his interpretation, Spinoza develops the idea of what is referred to in analytic philosophy as “access consciousness”, which is distinct from phenomenal consciousness. This concept plays a determining role in shaping the self of the human mind. In “Belief as an Essentially Human Attitude”, Ursula Renz challenges the Hegelian view that Spinoza’s philosophy leaves no room for finite subjectivity. She sets out a metaphysics of belief and demonstrates that opinion and belief necessitate the existence of a human subject. As human beings evolve in particular social environments, these beliefs and opinions express a certain perspective on human life.

Part IV delves into the nature of the human body, examining its ability to affect and be affected by other bodies. It begins with “Axiom Four of Part Two of the Ethics Deserves Paparazzi”, in which Noa Shein explores E2a4, where Spinoza claims that we sense our body being affected in various ways. This axiom refers to the way in which we experience our existence as finite modes: we perceive a multiplicity of bodily affections and realize that our body is affected by other bodies, as well as it affects other bodies. Through the sensory experience of our body being affected, we can also have a sense of the existence of other bodies, and, therefore, extension.

In “Spinoza and the Galenic Idea of the Human Body”, Beth Lord claims that Galenism plays a determining role in understanding the body, soul, and desires in the Short Treatise. In her view, in the Ethics, Spinoza would adhere to Galenism regarding living bodies but not human experience and motivation, primarily due to the concept of conatus. However, one could argue that Spinoza uses the concept of ingenium as a substitute for the concept of temperament in the Ethics, thereby distancing himself from the Galenic notion of temperament and its associated ideas of body equilibrium and organic fate.

Part V addresses the socio-political relevance of the human lifeform. It explores themes such as friendship, human laws, and religious toleration. In “The Authority of Humanity. Human Living and Intellectual Friendship in Spinoza”, Mogens Lærke demonstrates that private “authority to teach and advise”, as exemplified by the Epistles of the Apostles in the TTP, is connected to the notion of humanitas. This concept lies at the core of Spinoza’s conception of intellectual friendship. In “Spinoza’s Conception of Law from a Human Perspective”, Philip Waldner shows that although Spinoza appears to dispense with teleology, the normativity of human laws entails such a teleology. From a practical perspective, they cannot be reduced to efficient causation. But one could argue that laws based on human decisions (type II) necessarily involve human nature, which obeys to the universal laws of nature (type I) that rely on efficient causation. In “Ingenium and the Argument for Religious Toleration in Spinoza”, Daniel Garber argues that, while there are universal dogmas to which all religions should ascribe, differences among religions should be tolerated based on the ingenia of groups of people.

Part VI is devoted to human life from an eternal perspective. In “Becoming One: Theology and Philosophy, Will and Intellect, Mode and Substance in Spinoza”, Michael Della Rocca emphasizes unification as a condition of human existence in the Ethics. He argues for the unity of a rationally founded religion and philosophy, which is perceived due to the unity of the will and the intellect. He also highlights the unity of modes and substance and contends that Spinoza “carries out some kind of stripping away of distinctions between mode and substance” (245) by adopting a “purified, negation-less concept” of mode (254). After all, even the strong monistic view adopts a certain perspective on human existence. However, this raises the question of whether there is anything particular about human essence if we are all modes united with the substance. It is interesting to note that a volume that tends to challenge the monistic view gives voice to integral monism in its final part. It thus incorporates a certain degree of polyphony.

In conclusion, I highly recommend reading this collective volume. It leaves no doubt that Spinoza does indeed have a conception of human nature worthy of study and discussion. This new insight into Spinoza’s philosophy should be welcomed in the scholarship as a reinterpretation of Spinoza as a thinker of the virtues and trials of humanity—or, should I say, humanitas. One might then question whether Spinoza could, in fact, be considered as a humanist thinker in his own way, since his approach is to understand humankind rather than laugh at it.