Comment on The “Boghossian Report” on the state of scholarship in the humanities and humanistic social sciences (UPDATED) by Panu Raatikainen

I am reading 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗕𝗼𝗴𝗵𝗼𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗿𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 with mixed feelings. It is, in various ways, moderate and careful, and it certainly makes many apt observations. On the other hand, it also appears to me somewhat incoherent.

Given the large number of philosophers on the Commission (four out of ten), it is—considering the Commission’s aims—striking that there is not a single philosopher of science, let alone one specializing in the philosophy of the social sciences. I think this absence shows.

As for relativism, there are both extreme and disastrous forms, as well as more moderate and plausible versions. I do not think it is helpful to lump them all together and treat them as a single unified radical view.

Insofar as relativism is a real influence in the social sciences, I think it is mistaken to suggest that it is a result of recent French philosophy or that it is essentially connected to leftist politics. In fact, it is as old as the social sciences themselves and goes back to the nineteenth century. Relativism often drew on traditions of German idealism and the Counter-Enlightenment, which were more traditionalist and conservative rather than progressive movements. If it is claimed that radical relativism has now become substantially more influential in the social sciences, this would require systematic quantitative evidence for such a shift; I do not think anyone has provided such evidence.

For what it is worth, my simple view is that non-philosophers often tend not to be very good philosophers (I would say this is as true of physicists as it is of sociologists). However, when assessing the quality of their academic work, one should focus on evaluating their actual research, conclusions, and evidence, rather than their often clumsy and ambiguous occasional remarks of a more philosophical nature (on, say, truth, objectivity, or relativity). One should look at what they do during the week—not at how they philosophize on Sundays. A scholar may well hold some questionable philosophical views and yet produce excellent research in their own discipline. Non-philosophers may also lack many of the finer distinctions that philosophers make and may express, in passing, views that appear more radical than those they would endorse upon more careful reflection. It has long been my impression that philosophers, in particular, tend to assign too much importance to the former.

That said, there is certainly a great deal of poor-quality science. The explosion in the number of publications, driven by increasing pressure to publish more and more, essentially guarantees this. Various economic incentives may also reinforce this. This phenomenon is not necessarily related to any specific “postmodern” philosophy or the politicization of science. Again, the conclusion that such a causal connection exists would require systematic empirical research.